New Ethereum proposal aims to allow wallets to permanently d
Ethereum developer nicolashw submitted a core EIP draft, "Permanent Exit from EOA Delegation," on October 30, which would allow externally owned accounts to permanently disable EIP-7702 delegation while retaining their original address, transfer and contract-calling capabilities. The draft has not been assigned a number, has not been merged, requires a network upgrade to activate, and cannot prevent fund transfers after a private key leak.
Event Timeline
- [10-31 00:32] New Ethereum proposal would allow wallets to permanently disable EIP-7702 delegation (Wu Blockchain)
- [10-31 10:55] New Ethereum draft proposes allowing wallets to permanently disable EIP-7702 delegation (PANews)
Background and Impact
On October 30, 2026, Ethereum developer nicolashw submitted a core EIP draft titled "Permanent Exit from EOA Delegation," which would allow externally owned accounts (EOAs) controlled by keys to permanently disable the EIP-7702 delegation function. According to The Defiant, Wu Blockchain followed up on the news at 00:32 on October 31 and PANews at 10:55 on October 31. Both sources confirm that the proposal has not yet been assigned a number, remains open and unmerged, and would still need to be activated through a network upgrade if adopted.
Mechanically, the draft would use a currently invalid EIP-7702 type 4 transaction to install a non-executable three-byte marker in the account, causing future delegation authorizations to be skipped. The operation is irreversible and, unlike merely clearing existing delegations, prevents the account from authorizing smart contract code to run on its behalf in the future. Both sources note that the account retains its original address and the ability to make ordinary transfers and contract calls; PANews further specifies that "incoming calls will not execute code," while Wu Blockchain's phrasing is that the original address, ordinary transfers and contract-calling capabilities are retained, without elaborating on this detail.
The draft also sets out the boundaries of this design: it can only block EIP-7702 delegation and cannot guard against other risks after a private key is stolen. If the private key leaks, an attacker can still transfer funds, grant token approvals or sign contract authorizations, and existing approvals will not be revoked. Exiting delegation may also disable account recovery features that depend on delegation, or make assets that require the old delegated code inaccessible. In other words, the mechanism offers an irreversible "self-lock" option, and users need to confirm before enabling it that they do not rely on delegation to achieve account recovery.
In terms of impact, EIP-7702 lets EOAs temporarily take on smart contract capabilities, expanding functional boundaries while introducing a new attack surface; permanent exit offers a path for users who do not want to bear such risks, at the cost of irreversibility and the possible loss of recovery options. At present there is considerable searching around account opening and deposit processes for wallets and trading platforms; keywords such as Huobi HTX registration app download, Gate.io registration app download, Bitget registration app download, Binance registration app download and OKX registration app download are often used to find account setup tutorials, but such tutorials do not cover the feature switch in this draft; whether an EOA offers this marker depends on wallet implementation and the progress of subsequent network upgrades. Until the draft is merged and assigned a number, the feature remains at the proposal stage only.
FAQ
### Is this proposal in effect now?
No. Both sources point out that the draft was submitted on October 30, has not been merged, has not been assigned an EIP number, and is open and unmerged. Even if it is adopted later, it would need to be activated through an Ethereum network upgrade, and only then would it affect wallet implementations.
### Can it be reversed after delegation is permanently disabled?
No. The draft is designed as an irreversible operation; unlike merely clearing existing delegations, it prevents the account from authorizing smart contract code to run on its behalf in the future. Users therefore need to confirm before enabling it that they do not rely on delegation for account recovery, otherwise asset access may be affected.
### Can disabling delegation prevent funds from being moved after a private key leak?
No. The draft explicitly states